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"Small Numbers" and Strict Scrutiny:
Differential Taxation of the Press
By ALEC HUNTER BOYD*
Introduction
[A]ny effort to solve the broader problems of a monopoly press by
forcing newspapers to cover all "newsworthy" events and print all
viewpoints ... is likely to undermine such independence as the
press now shows without achieving any real diversity. Govern-
ment measures to encourage a multiplicity of outlets, rather than
compelling a few outlets to represent everybody, seems a far prefer-
able course of action. Such a goal cannot be reached by mere en-
forcement of the antitrust laws. It will undoubtedly be necessary
to go to the economic roots of the problem and either by govern-
ment subsidies or other devices create an open market with a new
form of economic base.'
Twenty years after Professor Emerson's call for a revitalization of
the system of freedom of expression, the vitality of the marketplace of
ideas continues to erode.2 Unfortunately, any legislature that seeks to
implement Professor Emerson's suggestion of a press subsidy plan, aimed
at fostering the marketplace of ideas by combatting media monopoly,
faces a potentially insurmountable barrier in the Press Clause of the First
Amendment as currently interpreted by the Supreme Court.
In Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Commissioner of Reve-
nue,3 the Supreme Court articulated the first two prongs of a new First
* Member, Third Year Class; B.S., University of Oregon, 1989. The author would like
to thank Pete Messer, Carolyn Nestor, Greg Oakes, Kevin Boyer and Georgi Kelly for their
assistance.
1. THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 671 (1970).
2. See infra part IV (discussing the continuing trend in the United States toward media
concentration and monopolization).
3. 460 U.S. 575 (1983). This case has generated a wealth of critical comment. See Jerry
R. Parkinson, Note, Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue:
Differential Taxation of the Press Violates the First Amendment, 69 IOWA L. REv. 1103 (1984);
Leila Sadat-Keeling, Note, Supreme Court Finds First Amendment a Barrier to Taxation of the
Press, 58 TUL. L. REv. 1073 (1985); Mark J. Schwemler, Comment, Non-general Schemes of
Taxation Violate First Amendment Free Press Clause, 89 DICK. L. REV. 261 (1984); Todd F.
Simon, All The News That's Fit to Tax: First Amendment Limitations on State And Local
Taxation of the Press, 21 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 59 (1985).
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Amendment doctrine, the three pronged singling out rule.4 The first two
prongs of the singling out rule hold taxation of the press presumptively
unconstitutional if the press is singled out for taxation from: 1) other
businesses; or, 2) other members of the press.' In articulating these two
prongs, the Court saw its prior decisions, which held censorially moti-
vated taxation of the press invalid, as an insufficient guarantee of press
freedom.' Consequently, the Court decided it was necessary to analyze
the First Amendment anew. Ultimately, the Court struck down a con-
tent neutral law that was economically beneficial to the press. In so
doing, the Court acted out of concern that singling out the press, even
without censorial motivation, could threaten the press's editorial
independence.'
After this case, commentators feared that the press would use the
singling out rule in a flood of challenges to state tax structures.9 These
fears were reinforced in 1987 when the Court in Arkansas Writers' Pro-
ject, Inc. v. Ragland added a third prong to the singling out rule pro-
claiming content based differential taxation of the press to be
presumptively unconstitutional as well. 10 One commentator suggested,
after examining lower court cases following Minneapolis Star and
Ragland, that the lower courts were at the beginning of a wholesale in-
validation of state laws differentially taxing the press.'
4. See Randall P. Bezanson, Political Agnosticism, Editorial Freedom, and Government
Neutrality Toward the Press: Observations on Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Commissioner of Revenue, 72 IowA L. REV. 1359, 1365 (1987) (discussing the Minneapolis
Star Court's articulation of the first two prongs of the singling out rule).
5. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
6. Id. at 580 (viewing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) as being
limited to situations where a censorial motivation is present on the part of the legislature and
not merely the singling out of the press for special taxation). A contrary view of Grosjean was
expressed in Mabee v. White Plains Publishing Co., 327 U.S. 178, 184 (1946) in which the
court saw the distinguishing facts of Grosjean as being that "the press was singled out for
special taxation and the tax was graduated in accordance with the volume of circulation."
7. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 603 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Minneapolis Star &
Tribune was benefitted to the amount of $16,000 in the two years in question. .. ").
8. Id at 583-85. For a comprehensive analysis of the theoretical underpinnings of the
Court's concern for editorial freedom, see Bezanson, supra note 4. Professor Bezanson sug-
gests that while the Court expressed a clear desire to promote editorial freedom, the Court is
not very clear in explaining how singling out the press will interfere with editorial freedom. In
his article, Professor Bezanson attempts to explain how the singling out rule relates to editorial
freedom.
9. See, e.g., Simon, supra note 3, at 89 ("Unfortunately, the Minneapolis Star Court does
not seem to have considered the effects of its new rules. These rules may result in continual
disruption of state tax systems as media corporations file challenges in the name of First
Amendment equity.... A flood of cases should be expected.").
10. 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
11. Richard J. Tofel, Is Differential Taxation of Press Entities by States Constitutional?, 72
J. TAX'N 42 (July 1990). Tofel notes:
536
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The lower courts struggled to interpret the Supreme Court's broad
statements of First Amendment values when analyzing state tax schemes
in the wake of Minneapolis Star and Ragland.2 Because of the lack of
clear rules, state and federal lower courts addressed differential taxation
of the press in widely differing fashions.13
In 1991, recognizing the confusion which reigned in the lower
courts, the Supreme Court revisited the singling out rule in Leathers v.
Medlock.14 Unfortunately, this most recent attempt to clarify the three
prongs of the singling out rule has not resulted in a rule that will allow
innovative legislatures room to attempt to foster diversity of expression
while still safeguarding the integrity of the press.1" This Note analyzes
the Court's rulings on differential taxation of the press and suggests a
review scheme that will effectively promote the values the Court has
cited as underlying freedom of the press. In examining the policy impli-
cation of the Court's differential taxation decisions, this Note focuses on
the differential taxation of newspapers because of the watchdog role the
printed press has historically played in American politics. 6
Part I of this Note addresses the original articulation of the Court's
three pronged singling out rule in Minneapolis Star and Ragland. Part
II examines the lower courts' contradictory applications of this rule fol-
lowing Minneapolis Star and Ragland. Part III addresses the Court's
recent rearticulation of the rules governing differential taxation of the
press in Leathers v. Medlock. Part IV presents a two-fold criticism of the
singling out rule as clarified in Medlock. Part V will propose that the
Court abandon the second prong of the singling out rule, and this Note
will conclude that a press subsidy plan designed to foster First Amend-
ment values could survive constitutional scrutiny under such a revised
singling out rule.
I. The Singling Out Rule
The Court articulated the first two prongs of the singling out rule in
If, as the courts of Louisiana, New York, Oklahoma and Tennessee have concluded,
the second rule of Minneapolis Star is to read to mean what it says, the implications
for state taxation of the press in this country could be considerable.... The differen-
tial taxation of magazines could by itself render 16 states' taxation of the press
unconstitutional.
Id. at 43.
12. See infra part I.
13. See infira part II.
14. 111 S. Ct. 1438 (1991).
15. See infra part IV.
16. See infra notes 187-93 and accompanying text (discussing the watchdog role played by
the printed press); infra notes 224-28 (discussing the use of government subsidies to increase
the quantity of newspapers and the effect of such subsidies on the watchdog role of the printed
press).
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Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue. 7 In
Minneapolis Star, the Court confronted a tax scheme that resulted in dif-
ferential taxation of the press from other businesses and between mem-
bers of the press. The Court invalidated the tax scheme at issue, but
declined to follow precedent.18 Instead, the Court pronounced the first
two prongs of the singling out rule: 1) the singling out of members of the
press from other businesses for taxation is presumptively unconstitu-
tional and, 2) the singling out of some press entities from other members
of the press is presumptively unconstitutional.' 9
The first two prongs of the singling out rule were a response to the
Minnesota tax scheme. The Minnesota legislature enacted a generally
applicable tax on the sale of goods in 1967.20 As a complement to its
sales tax system, Minnesota also enacted a use tax2' on any non-exempt
personal property that was not subject to the sales tax.22 The Supreme
Court inferred that the intent of the use tax was to eliminate the incentive
to avoid the sales tax by purchasing goods from other states.23 From the
enactment of this tax scheme until 1971, periodicals enjoyed an exemp-
tion from the sales and use taxes.
Between 1971 and 1974, the legislature modified the portions of the
tax scheme affecting periodicals. These modifications resulted in two
types of differential taxation of the press. First, by imposing a use tax on
ink and paper used in the preparation of a publication, the press was
singled out from other businesses as the only industry subject to a use tax
on components of goods to be sold at retail. 24 Second, by a 1974 legisla-
tive amendment that enacted a use tax exemption for the "first $100,000
worth of ink and paper consumed by a publication in any calendar year,"
certain larger press entities were singled out from the press as a whole for
taxation because they were the only press entities that used more than
$100,000 worth of ink and paper.25
The net effect of these modifications was to single out the large
17. 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
18. Id. at 580 (distinguishing Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)). See
infra notes 28-37 (discussing Grosjean).
19. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
20. Act of June 1, 1967, ch. 32, art. XIII, § 2, 1967 Minn. Laws 2143, 2179 (codified at
MINN. STAT. § 297A.02 (1982)).
21. A use tax is defined as an "ad valorem tax on the use, consumption, or storage of
tangible property, usually at the same rate as the sales tax, and levied for the purpose of
preventing tax avoidance by the purchase of articles in a state or taxing jurisdiction which does
not levy sales taxes." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1383 (5th ed. 1979).
22. MINN. STAT. § 297A.14 (1982)
23. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 577.
24. Id. at 578.
25. Id.
[Vol. 19:535
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newspapers in the State for taxation under the use tax. 26 The Minneapo-
lis Star Tribune bore close to two-thirds of the total receipts from the use
tax because of the application of the exemption to other smaller members
of the press.27 As a result, the Minneapolis Star Tribune challenged the
tax scheme as violating the constitutional guarantees of Freedom of the
Press and Equal Protection.
Previously, in Grosean v. American Press Co.,28 the Court had inval-
idated a Louisiana newspaper license tax that singled out 13 of the 124
publishers in the state. The tax at issue in Grosjean had been promul-
gated by Huey Long as a way of punishing newspapers he saw as his
political enemies.29 In Minneapolis Star, the Court distinguished the
Louisiana tax from the Minnesota tax at issue: "In the case currently
before us, however, there is no legislative history and no indication, apart
from the structure of the tax itself, of any impermissible or censorial mo-
tive on the part of the legislature."' 30 Noting that Grosjean was not con-
trolling because of the lack of a censorial motive, the Court declared, "we
must analyze the problem anew under the general principles of the First
Amendment."3 1
The Court refused to analyze the tax scheme under the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. This is significant because the tax scheme was arguably
beneficial to the press, and consequently would have been upheld under
equal protection analysis. Because the press was subject to the use tax
instead of the sales tax, unlike other businesses, the press avoided some
tax liability.32 Consequently, the tax scheme arguably "benefitted, not
burdened, the 'freedom of speech, [and] of the press.' ,33 The Court ap-
plies the rational basis test in equal protection cases in which it concludes
no fundamental right is violated.34 In these situations, the state need
only demonstrate a legitimate governmental interest that is rationally re-
26. Id. at 578-79 (In 1974, only 14 of the 388 paid circulation newspapers incurred a tax
liability. In 1975, only 16 of the 374 paid circulation newspapers incurred a tax liability.).
27. Id. at 579 ("In 1975, 13 publishers, producing 16 out of 374 paid circulation papers,
paid a tax. That year, Star Tribune again bore roughly two-thirds of the total receipts from the
use tax on ink and paper.").
28. 297 U.S. 233 (1936).
29. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 579-80 (Senator Long and the Governor of the State
distributed a flyer to the State legislature describing the tax as a "tax on lying.").
30. Id. at 580.
31. Id.
32. Justice Rehnquist determined that the Star Tribune actually avoided $2,440,345 in tax
liability for 1974 and 1975 by being subject to a use tax instead of the sales tax. Id. at 598
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
33. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. I).
34. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 (1976) ("equal
protection analysis requires strict scrutiny of a legislative classification only when the classifi-
cation impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right ...."). See also
Geoffry R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 50-52 (1987).
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lated to the proposed legislation.35 Courts have held that the imposition
of a generally applicable tax on the press, for purposes of raising revenue,
satisfies the rational relationship test.36 Justice Rehnquist, dissenting in
Minneapolis Star, would have analyzed the Minnesota tax under the
Equal Protection Clause and upheld the Minnesota tax scheme as being
rationally related to the State's interest in a fair tax scheme.37
Nonetheless, the Court did not rely upon traditional equal protec-
tion analysis in evaluating this tax scheme. Instead, the Court subjected
the tax to strict scrutiny arising directly under the First Amendment.
A. The First Prong: Singling Out The Press From Other Businesses
The Court articulated the first prong of the singling out rule in re-
sponse to the imposition of the use tax upon the press but not other busi-
nesses.38 The Court held that differential taxation, "unless justified by
some special characteristic of the press," will be upheld only if "the State
asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it can-
not achieve without differential taxation." 39 The Court held the mere
raising of revenue an insufficient interest to justify differential taxation of
the press from other general businesses.'
In reaching this holding, the Court was forced to justify First
Amendment protection for the press absent censorial motive on the part
of the legislature.4' The Court justified First Amendment protection for
two related reasons: the intent of the Framers of the Constitution, and
concern over the censorial capacity of differential taxation.42 In essence,
the Court argued that the Antifederalists were opposed to a congres-
sional power to tax the press because the singling out of the press created
an inherent threat to press independence:
When the state singles out the press... the political constraints
that prevent a legislature from passing crippling taxes of general
35. JOHN E. NOWAK, ET AL., CONSrrrUTIONAL LAW 524 (1978). See Citizen Publishing
Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143, 155-56 (1952) (upholding application of antitrust laws to
the press).
36. See, eg., Giragi v. Moore, 64 P.2d 819 (Ariz. 1937) (tax on income stemming from
newspaper subscriptions is constitutional, since the tax was generally applied and affected the
business end of the media).
37. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 602 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 582 ("By creating this special use tax... Minnesota has singled out the press for
special treatment. We then must determine whether the First Amendment permits such spe-
cial taxation.").
39. Id. at 585.
40. Id. at 586.
41. Id. at 580 ("In the case currently before us, however, there is no legislative history and
no indication, apart from the structure of the tax itself, of any impermissible or censorial mo-
tive on the part of the legislature."). Cf Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936)
(finding a censorial motive on the part of the legislature).
42. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 583-85.
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applicability are weakened, and the threat of burdensome taxes be-
comes acute. That threat can operate as effectively as a censor to
check critical comment by the press.43
Justice Rehnquist forcefully dissented from the Court's analysis of
this issue. Justice Rehnquist argued that because the Court has the abil-
ity to review subsequent changes in state tax laws that are intended to
penalize newspapers, the threat of potentially more burdensome treat-
ment in the future was not a compelling justification for strict scrutiny
now.' Justice White in a separate dissent agreed with Justice Rehn-
quist's analysis.45
B. The Second Prong: Singling Out A Few Members Of The Press
The Minneapolis Star Court articulated the second prong of the sin-
gling out rule in response to the imposition of the use tax on some press
entities but not others.4' The Court held that strict scrutiny review is
warranted when a "small group of newspapers" is targeted.47 The Court
reasoned that a tax "that targets individual publications within the press,
places a heavy burden on the State to justify its action."48
In analyzing the constitutionality of the tax exemption for smaller
newspapers, the Court once again focused on the potential for state abuse
of the taxing mechanism. The Court declared that "when the exemption
selects such a narrowly defined group to bear the full burden of the tax,
the tax begins to resemble more a penalty for a few of the largest newspa-
pers than an attempt to favor struggling smaller enterprises."'49 Surpris-
ingly, the Court made the pronouncement that "to tailor the tax so that
it singles out a few members of the press presents such a potential for
abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the scheme."
'50
Such a broad pronouncement seems to have been unnecessary because
the only interest asserted by the State was that of implementing an equi-
43. Id. at 584.
44. It. at 601 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The power to tax is not the power to destroy
while this court sits.") (quoting Justice Holmes in Panhandle Oil Co. v. Knox, 277 U.S. 218,
223 (1928)). Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court was experienced in reviewing legislation
to determine if it concealed some ulterior motive. Id.
45. Id at 593-96 (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (Justice White
joined the Court's opinion concerning the singling out of some members of the press for an
exemption from the use tax).
46. Id at 591 ("Minnesota's ink and paper tax violates the First Amendment not only
because it singles out the press, but also because it targets a small group of newspapers.").
47. Id
48. Id at 593.
49. Id. at 592 (In 1975, only 16 of the 374 paid circulation papers were singled out for
taxation.).
50. Id. at 593.
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table tax system.51
Justice Rehnquist took issue with the Court's characterization of the
exemption as a penalty. He perceived the exemption not as a penalty for
some newspapers but as a subsidy for all newspapers. Justice Rehnquist
argued that "the exemption is in effect a $4000 credit which benefits all
newspapers." 52 Consequently, Justice Rehnquist concluded that no fun-
damental right had been violated and that the State was acting "reason-
ably and rationally to fit its sales and use tax scheme to its own local
needs and usages."53
Minneapolis Star did not clarify several important aspects of the sec-
ond prong of the singling out rule. The Court left unclear whether any
interest might be deemed compelling enough to justify singling out mem-
bers of the press for taxation. It also left unclear how many members of
the press must be singled out from the press at large to qualify as a
"small number." Subsequently, the Court revisited the singling out rule
but failed to clarify these questions.
C. Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland: Articulating the Third Prong
In 1987, the Supreme Court expanded the application of the singling
out rule in Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland.54 A 1935 Arkansas
statute enacted a sales tax on tangible personal property.55 Items ex-
empted from the tax included the gross receipts of religious, professional,
trade and sports journals, newspapers, and all publications printed and
published within the State.56 The net effect of the scheme was to single
out one to three magazines for taxation.57 The statute was, therefore, a
generally applicable tax law that singled out some members of the press
for taxation based on their content. Arkansas Writer's Project chal-
lenged the Arkansas tax as violating the First Amendment.
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, noted that "the Arkansas
51. Id. The State's claim, however, is considerably undermined by the fact the State did
not grant exemptions to other non-press businesses subject to the use tax in order to effectuate
the asserted interest in a fair tax scheme.
52. Id. at 603 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 604.
54. 481 U.S. 221 (1987). For commentary on this case, see David L. Medford, Note,
Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v. Ragland: Taxation of the Press, 13 OKLA. CrrY U. L. REv.
401 (1988); Laura V. Farthing, Note, Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland: The Limits of
Content Discrimination Analysis, 78 GEO. L.J. 1949 (1990); Jeanne M. Lanese, Note, Arkansas
Tax Exemption Structure Imposes an Unconstitutional Burden on the Press, 65 U. DaT. L.
REv. 871 (1988).
55. ARK. CODE. ANN. § 84-1903(a) (Michie 1980 and Supp. 1985).
56. Id. §§ 84-1904(f), -1904(j).
57. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 229 n.4 (The Appellant contended that the Arkansas Times was
the only Arkansas publication that paid the tax. The Tax Commissioner contended that two
other publications also paid the tax.).
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sales tax scheme treats some magazines less favorably than others."58
Because the tax scheme singled out certain members of the press, the
Court held it was subject to a strict scrutiny analysis under the second
prong of the singling out rule articulated in Minneapolis Star.5 9 The
Court justified strict scrutiny based upon the risk of censorship posed by
differential taxation noted in Minneapolis Star.' The Court, however,
did not stop its analysis after finding that the tax scheme fell under the
second prong of Minneapolis Star.
The facts in Ragland were distinguishable from Minneapolis Star.
Unlike the Minnesota tax scheme, the Arkansas tax scheme was not con-
tent neutral: "a magazine's tax status depends entirely upon its con-
tent."61 The Court noted that a content based differentiation is "a more
disturbing use of selective taxation than Minneapolis Star" because the
risk of censorship is acute.6' The Court declared that "[r]egulations
which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the content
of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment."63
The tax scheme was distinguishable from Minneapolis Star for a sec-
ond reason: the tax scheme discriminated between different types of
press entities - magazines and newspapers." The Court, however,
chose to focus on the content discrimination between magazines and did
not address the separate issue of whether disparate treatment between
newspapers and magazines should independently invalidate the statute.65
The holding in Ragland, therefore, was limited to the singling out of
members of the same type of press entity, as in Minneapolis Star.
The State of Arkansas asserted an important interest in support of
its tax scheme: the encouragement of fledgling publishers.66 The Court,
however, did not decide if this interest could be sufficiently compelling.
Instead, it assumed the interest was compelling but determined that the
tax failed to narrowly effectuate this interest.
67
58. Id at 229.
59. MkL See also supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing the singling out of
members of the press).
60. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 229.
61. Id (religious, professional, trade and sports journals were specifically exempted).
62. Id
63. Id. (citing Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 648-49 (1984)).
64. ARK. CODE ANN. § 84-1904(0 (Michie 1980 and Supp. 1985).
65. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 233.
66. Id. at 232. The State reasoned that by giving tax breaks to fledgling publishers it
would make it easier for new publications to survive, thus enriching the media mix in the state.
It is upon this interest that a state legislature would have to rely, if it sought to implement a
press subsidy plan utilizing tax exemptions. See infra notes 225-28 (discussing press
subsidization).
67. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 232 (the Court noted that the tax exemption was not targeted at
"fledgling publishers" but included established publications which had the proper content).
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In response to the application of the strict scrutiny standard, Justice
Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, vigorously dissented. Justice
Scalia, echoing Chief Justice Rehnquist's earlier dissent in Minneapolis
Star, argued that the tax exemption should be categorized as a subsidy. 8
If the exemption is viewed as a subsidy, Justice Scalia argued, then it
should be subject to the deferential standard of review adopted in Regan
v. Taxation with Representation of Washington.69
In Regan, the Court was confronted with a law that gave a tax ex-
emption to Veterans' organizations, which had lobbying as one of their
activities, but did not grant a tax exemption to other lobbying organiza-
tions. The Court held that "a legislature's decision not to subsidize the
exercise of a fundamental right does not infringe the right, and thus is
not subject to strict scrutiny."7 By analogy, Justice Scalia contended,
the Arkansas statute also was a mere subsidy that did not infringe upon a
fundamental right, and therefore was appropriately subject only to ra-
tional basis review.71 The Ragland majority was unmoved by Justice
Scalia's arguments, noting that the exemption resulted in a distortion of
the marketplace of ideas by fostering only "communication on religion,
sports, professional and trade matters."72
Ragland draws a bright line in holding that content based differen-
tial taxation is impermissible. The Court, however, intentionally avoided
addressing whether the singling out rule would be offended by differential
taxation of different types of press entities.7" Further, Ragland did not
clarify the questions left unresolved by Minneapolis Star. The Court held
that one to three publishers were a "small number" under the second
prong, but once again failed to articulate any criteria to support that
holding. The Court also failed to address whether any state interest
could be found sufficiently compelling to override the freedom of press
issue at stake.
Significantly, in 1989 the Court had the opportunity to address what
interests might be found compelling under the Ragland ruling in Texas
Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock.74 Texas exempted religious periodicals from its
sales tax. The rationale behind this exemption was to prevent excessive
government entanglement with religion, a potentially compelling First
68. Id. at 236-37 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (Justice Scalia noted "that tax exemptions, credits,
and deductions are a 'form of subsidy that is administered through the tax system .... ' ")
(quoting Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540, 544 (1983)).
69. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
70. Id. at 549.
71. Ragland, 481 U.S. at 236 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 232.
73. Id at 233.
74. 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
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Amendment concern.75 The plurality opinion held the statute to violate
the Establishment Clause and avoided the free press issue altogether.76
In a separate concurrence, however, Justices Blackmun and O'Connor
indicated that a narrowly tailored statute that exempts both philosophi-
cal and religious material would survive strict scrutiny under the Press
Clause.77 Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and Scalia, dis-
senting, appeared to share the view of Justices Blackmun and O'Connor,
when they noted that "the Constitution sometimes requires accommoda-
tion of religious expression despite not only the Establishment Clause but
also the Speech and Press Clauses., 78 It therefore appears that at least
five of the Justices would find that a tax that exempts religious and philo-
sophical periodicals constitutional. Justice Souter's and Justice Thomas'
views are as yet unknown. Justice White, concurring, noted in a one
paragraph opinion that the Ragland holding alone should have invali-
dated the tax.
79
The Court's failure to revisit the Ragland ruling in Texas Monthly
left the lower courts with only minimal guidance in the application of the
singling out rule until the 1991 Leathers v. Medlock decision.
II. Confusion in the Lower Court: Decisions following
Minneapolis Star and Ragland
Minneapolis Star and Ragland provided lower courts with uncertain
guidance when they faced content neutral differential taxation of the
press. Minneapolis Star is dispositive on its very limited factual circum-
stance, singling out a small number of newspapers to effectuate the gov-
ernmental interest of a "fair" tax structure,80 and Ragland invalidated
content based taxation that differentiated between magazines.8" Accord-
ingly, the lower courts made their own rules within the confines of the
broad principles articulated in those cases. As one lower court noted:
75. Id. at 27-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("If the Free Exercise Clause suggests that a
State may not tax the sale of religious literature by a religious organization, this fact alone
would give a State a compelling reason to exclude this category of sales from an otherwise
general sales tax.").
76. Id. at 5.
77. Id at 27-28 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
78. Id. at 45.
79. Id. at 25-26 (White, J., concurring). Only one lower court has subsequently addressed
the issue. The Fourth Circuit adopted the position of Justice White, invalidating a tax that
exempted religious periodicals under the principle stated in Ragland. Finlator v. Powers, 902
F.2d 1158 (4th Cir. 1990). Prior to the Texas Monthly decision, however, the Florida Supreme
Court suggested that a sales tax exemption for religious publications could pass constitutional
muster under Minneapolis Star and Ragland. In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor, 509 So.
2d 292, 308-09 (Fla. 1987).
80. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Conm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 591-92
(1983).
81. Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231, 234 (1987).
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Extant jurisprudence gives no indication that the two pronounce-
ments [Minneapolis Star and Ragland] invoked by the [t]axpayer[s]
were intended to be rigidly confined within their specific scenarios.
Rather, we find that the Court-announced constitutional standards
are meant for broad and general application to the press. 2
The Supreme Court's failure to guide the lower courts resulted in
application of the singling out rule to a number of different factual situa-
tions"3 and in a variety of ways.8 4
A. Defining a "Small Number" of the Press
Under Minneapolis Star and Ragland, a lower court must invalidate
a tax scheme if it finds that a small number of press entities have been
singled out for differential taxation." Unfortunately, Minneapolis Star
offered no criteria for determining what is a small number, and Ragland
did not address whether differential taxation of one type of press entity
could qualify. Consequently, the lower courts had unlimited discretion
in determining what constituted a small number of press entities.
The issue of what constitutes the singling out of a small number of
press entities was squarely addressed by a Louisiana court in Louisiana
Life, Ltd. v. McNamara.6 At issue was a tax that exempted newspapers
but not other periodic publications.8 7 In determining if the tax singled
out a small number of press entities, the court did not feel bound by the
factual circumstances in Minneapolis Star, the singling out of a few large
newspapers for taxation."8 Instead, the court applied the Minneapolis
Star holding to the singling out of one type 89 of press entity,90 recogniz-
82. Jones & Co. v. State ex rel Tax Comm'n, 787 P.2d 843, 846 (Okla. 1990).
83. Hornstein v. Hartigan, 676 F. Supp. 894 (C.D. Ill. 1988) (advertising); J-R Distribu-
tors v. Eikenberry, 725 F.2d 482 (9th Cir. 1984) (fines); Century Federal v. City of Palo Alto,
710 F. Supp. 1559 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (franchise fees); Legi-Tech v. Keiper, 766 F.2d 728 (2d.
Cir. 1985) (limits on access to information).
But see Jensen v. Stengel, 762 F.2d 815 (9th Cir. 1985) (excluding copyright fees from
Minneapolis Star protection); MNC of Hinesville v. United States Dep't of Defense, 792 F.2d
1466 (1986) (excluding nonpublic speech); Redwood Empire Publishing v. State Bd. of Equali-
zation, 207 Cal. App. 3d 1334 (1st Dist. 1989) (excluding commercial speech); Doe v. City of
Minneapolis, 898 F.2d 612 (8th Cir. 1990) (excluding indirect economic activities).
84. See infra parts II.A, B (discussing lower court confusion in applying Minneapolis
Star).
85. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 591; Ragland, 481 U.S. at 228-29.
86. 504 So. 2d 900 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
87. Id. at 902 (the exemption is set forth in LA. Rnv. STAT. ANN. § 47:305D(1)(e)) (West
1990).
88. Id at 903. See Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 578-79 (discussing the singling out of
newspapers that used more than $100,000 of ink and paper from newspapers that used less
than $100,000 of ink and paper).
89. The courts have recognized that the free press guarantee extends from "newspapers,
magazines, and books to, inter alia, motion pictures, news wire services, and interactive elec-
tronic data base services." Tofel, supra note 11, at 45.
90. Louisiana Life, 504 So.2d at 905.
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ing as it did so that the "'press in its historic connotation comprehends
every sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opin-
ion.' "91 The court reasoned: "[The tax scheme] produces the same dis-
criminatory result between newspaper publishers and magazine
publishers.., that the Minnesota statute created between small periodi-
cal publishers and large newspapers." 92 Consequently, the court invali-
dated the Louisiana tax scheme.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court reached a similar result in Jones &
Co. v. State ex rel. Tax Commissioner.93 In Jones, the challenged statute
differentially taxed members of the press according to the mode of deliv-
ery and cost.94 The court held "[the exemption provision] is a narrowly
'targeted' levy exemption in the sense that its provisions aim at taxing a
specific class of publications... [those] sold for more than seventy five
cents or distributed by mail .... ,9 Without finding the tax to be a
content based discrimination the court relied upon Ragland, which was
aimed at a content based discrimination.96 The court justified this ap-
proach by declaring: "Although not based on content, [the tax] targets
only certain publications and hence violates the spirit, if not the letter, of
both the First Amendment and the teachings of Ragland.'' 97 Conse-
quently, the court held invalid the taxation of those publications not sub-
ject to the exemption.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court revisited the tax scheme challenged
in Jones in Oklahoma Broadcasters Association v. Oklahoma Tax Com-
mission.98 In Oklahoma Broadcasters members of the broadcast media
challenged the portions of the state tax scheme that taxed broadcasters.99
The court first determined that broadcasters were members of the
press."° Because broadcasters were members of the press, regardless of
the number of members affected, the court concluded that they were de-
serving of protection under the singling out rule articulated in Minneapo-
lis Star and Ragland."' Consequently, the court held the taxation of
broadcasters, but not other types of press entities, to be an invalid sin-
gling out of members of the press.
91. Id. at 903 (quoting Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938)).
92. Id. at 905.
93. 787 P.2d 843 (Okla. 1990).
94. OKLA. STAT. tit. 68 § 1357(c) (1981).
95. Jones, 787 P.2d at 846.
96. Id See also Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229-30 (1987)
("[Tihe basis on which Arkansas differentiates between magazines is particularly repugnant to
First Amendment principles: a magazine's tax status depends entirely upon its content.").
97. Jones, 787 P.2d. at 846.
98. 789 P.2d 1312 (Okla. 1990).
99. A similar issue was addressed in New York in McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 541 N.Y.S.2d 252 (A.D. 3d Dept. 1989).
100. Oklahoma Broadcasters, 789 P.2d at 1316.
101. Id.
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In each of these cases, the courts disregarded the quantity of press
entities singled out.10 2 In Louisiana Life, the court analogized the sin-
gling out of all magazines to the singling out of large newspapers in Min-
neapolis Star.1 03  This comparison is not convincing because the
Minnesota tax scheme only taxed sixteen newspapers" 4 while the Louisi-
ana scheme taxed a much greater number of magazines. Furthermore,
the Oklahoma court in Jones and Oklahoma Broadcasters, relying upon
the Ragland decision in which only three magazines were taxed, 05 was
satisfied that any differential taxation of press entities was sufficient to
constitute a singling out of the press. The courts in these cases divorced
the holdings of Minneapolis Star and Ragland from their narrow facts.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, in Hearst Corporation v. Iowa
Department of Revenue and Finance,"'6 the Iowa Supreme Court upheld
a tax scheme which granted exemptions to newspapers but not
magazines. 0 7 The court held that the Iowa tax scheme did not single out
"small groups of publications."' 0 In reaching this conclusion, the court
did not assess the quantity of publications affected by the tax. Instead,
the court reasoned that the tax scheme itself was of such a form that the
holdings in Minneapolis Star and Ragland did not apply. The court
noted at the outset of its analysis that tax exemptions are a form of sub-
sidy." The court held that the reasoning of Regan v. Taxation With
Representation of Washington 110 gave the legislature broad discretion to
create classifications in tax statutes."' Specifically, the court noted that
"the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the most
explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive dis-
crimination against particular persons and classes.""' 2
Because the Iowa tax scheme did not discriminate between media
entities of the same type, the court argued that the tax did not fall under
102. See also Medlock v. Pledger, 785 S.W.2d 202 (Ark. 1990) (differential treatment of
cable TV from other press entities); Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers, 565 So.
2d 1304 (Fla. 1990) (differential treatment of magazines from newspapers); Newsweek, Inc. v.
Celauro, 789 S.W.2d 247 (Tenn. 1990) (same); McGraw-Hill, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 541
N.Y.S.2d 252 (A.D. 3d Dept. 1989) (differential treatment of print and broadcast media);
Satellink of Chicago v. City of Chicago, 523 N.E.2d 13 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1988) (differential
treatment of subscription TV from franchise TV).
103. See supra note 92 and accompanying text.
104. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S 575, 579
(1983).
105. Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 n.4 (1987).
106. 461 N.W.2d 295 (Iowa 1990).
107. IOWA CODE §§ 422.43, 422.45(9) (1977).
108. Hearst, 461 N.W.2d at 302.
109. Id. at 304.
110. 461 U.S. 540 (1983). See supra notes 70-72 and accompanving text (discussing
Regan).
111. Hearst, 461 N.W.2d at 304.
112. Id. at 304 (quoting Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)).
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the holding in Minneapolis Star."3 Further, because the Iowa tax
scheme was content neutral, the court held it was factually distinguished
from Ragland."4 In essence, the court interpreted the broad pronounce-
ments of Minneapolis Star and Ragland to apply only to differential taxa-
tion of the same type of press entities or to content based distinctions. By
confining the application of the singling out rule, the Hearst court ap-
peared to be attempting to strike a balance between Justice Scalia's dis-
sent in Ragland and the majority opinions in Minneapolis Star and
Ragland. By fashioning a narrow rule, however, the Hearst court ig-
nored the concerns raised in Minneapolis Star and Ragland over the cen-
sorial capacity of certain taxes.
Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit undertook a similar analytic
process to that of the Hearst court in Kucharek v. Hanaway."5 In
Kucharek, the owner of a pornographic bookstore challenged a Wiscon-
sin statute that banned some forms of obscenity." 6 The plaintiffs admit-
ted that it is permissible under the First Amendment to ban obscenity." 7
Nonetheless, Judge Posner noted that an obscenity statute that banned
only certain types of obscenity could run afoul of the First Amend-
ment."' Citing Ragland, Judge Posner reasoned, "[t]he state is permit-
ted to suppress obscenity but it is not permitted to distort the
marketplace of erotic discourse by suppressing only that obscenity which
conveys a disfavored message.""' 9 While Judge Posner recognized that
Ragland addressed content based discrimination, he suggested that a
facially content neutral statute might be brought under the purview of
Ragland, due to the effect of the restriction. Specifically, Judge Posner
noted, "a statute that exempts a particular material embodiment... such
as videotapes... does not present a danger of distorting the market in
ideas and expression unless particular messages are correlated with par-
ticular material embodiments .... ,, 12 0 If the court found such a correla-
tion to exist, then it would be forced to evaluate the statute in light of the
Ragland strict scrutiny standard. 12 1
113. Id.
114. Id
115. 902 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1990).
116. Wis. STAT. § 944.21 (1988).
117. Kucharek, 902 F.2d at 517. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (holding that
obscenity may be suppressed by the state).
118. Kucharek, 902 F.2d at 517-18. Judge Posner whimsically suggested that suppression
only of "anti-Communist obscenity" might run afoul of the First Amendment, but failed to
suggest a more realistic form of discrimination. Id A more likely discrimination might be a
statute that targeted only homosexual obscenity.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987) ("The state must
show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn
to achieve that end.").
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By focusing on correlations between the type of press entities singled
out and content, Judge Posner expanded upon the analysis supporting
Minneapolis Star. Minneapolis Star suggests that the singling out of a
few members of the press is to be prohibited for fear of distorting the
marketplace of ideas. 122 Judge Posner's analysis suggests that differential
taxation of the press should be held suspect only if an actual risk of dis-
torting the marketplace of ideas exists in the form of a correlation be-
tween the type of press singled out and certain ideas.
B. Evaluating the Governmental Interests
The Supreme Court applies the strict scrutiny test in cases in which
a fundamental right has been violated. 123 Under the strict scrutiny test
the state must show the legislation at issue is pursuing a compelling gov-
ernmental interest and that the legislation is the least restrictive means to
achieve this interest.124 Under Minneapolis Star and Ragland strict scru-
tiny is applied: "[W]e cannot countenance such treatment unless the
State asserts a counterbalancing interest of compelling importance that it
cannot achieve without differential taxation."' 25 The practical effect of
applying strict scrutiny is to invalidate almost all laws that are re-
viewed, 126 although sometimes the state is able to articulate a sufficiently
compelling interest.'27 In Minneapolis Star, the Court's only guidance
for the lower courts was the holding that the asserted state interest of
raising revenue in an equitable fashion was not compelling.128 Conse-
122. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983).
123. NOWAK, ET AL., supra note 35, at 524.
124. Id.
125. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585; see Ragland, 481 U.S. at 229.
126. The Supreme Court has rejected a number of interests as not sufficiently compelling to
justify infringement on the First Amendment. See, eg., Smith v. Daily Mail Publishing Co.,
443 U.S. 97 (1979) (a state's interest in preserving the anonymity of its juvenile offenders);
Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978) (a state's interest in preserv-
ing the integrity of its judiciary); Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308
(1977) (a state's interest in preserving the anonymity of its juvenile offenders); Nebraska Press
Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (a state's interest in protecting a criminal defendant's
Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial); Cox Broadcasting Co. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975) (a
state's interest in preserving the anonymity of victims of sexual assault and the right of pri-
vacy); Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367 (1947) (a state's interest in protecting the integrity of the
judiciary); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (a state's interest in preserving integrity of
public office).
127. The strict scrutiny test was met in Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 110 S.
Ct. 1391, 1401 (1990) (holding that the compelling reason of preventing corruption in the
political arena justified the legislation at issue).
128. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592. Justice Rehnquist would haxe found this interest
sufficient under rational basis review. Id. at 602 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). At least one lower
court would not find this interest sufficient even under rational basis review. Satellink of Chi-
cago, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 523 N.E.2d 13, 17 (Ill. App. Ist Dist. 1988) ("Neither raising
revenue nor equalizing the financial burden on cable television can support the targeting of
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quently, the lower courts evaluated the asserted government interests in
widely varying fashions.
At one end of the spectrum, the Louisiana Life court's analysis of
the asserted government interest erected a formidable barrier to a state
seeking to survive strict scrutiny. 129 The court determined that the State
did not assert a compelling interest by relying upon the pronouncement
in Minneapolis Star, that to tailor a "tax so that it singles out a few mem-
bers of the press presents such a potential for abuse that no interest...
can justify the scheme."' 30 The court held that "[h]owever much the
legislature may have intended to advance the causes of a free press and
an informed public, that governmental act of selecting one form of 'pro-
tected' speech over another for exempt status violates the instant tax-
payer's First Amendment rights."''
Similarly, in Department of Revenue v. Magazine Publishers,'32 the
court struck down a Florida tax scheme using strict scrutiny analysis.
The State asserted "a significant public interest in promoting publishers
who engage in the immediate dissemination of news; in publishing news
while it is new."' 33 The court held that the asserted interest was "clearly
not a compelling governmental interest." '134 In fact, the court suggested
that "[ilt is questionable whether this asserted interest would survive
even a rational relationship test."' 35
Those courts that seek to apply strict scrutiny have formulated tests
that insure a formidable protection of the press. Ironically, these courts'
inability to conceive of any interest that would justify differential taxa-
tion of the press fails to allow room for legislation aimed at fostering the
First Amendment values these courts are supposedly protecting. 36
At the opposite end of the spectrum, in Suburban Cable TV Co. v.
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania,137 the court upheld a statute under
strict scrutiny by relying upon the mere differences between the media
sought to be taxed and those untaxed. The Pennsylvania tax code
subscription television. The amendment does not withstand an equal protection challenge re-
gardless of the degree of scrutiny applied.").
129. Louisiana Life, Ltd. v. McNamara, 504 So. 2d 900, 905 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1987).
130. Id. (quoting Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 592).
131. Id.
132. 565 So. 2d 1304 (Fla. 1990).
133. Id. at 1308.
134. Id.
135. Id See also Newsweek, Inc. v. Celauro, 789 S.W.2d 247, 250 (Tenn. 1990); Southern
Living, Inc. v. Celauro, 789 S.W.2d 251, 253 (Tenn. 1990). Cf Hearst v. Iowa Dep't of Reve-
nue and Finance, 461 N.W.2d 295, 307 (Iowa 1990) (finding the State's interest in encouraging
the reading of newspapers and thereby enhancing the general knowledge and literacy of its
citizenry to be sufficient under the rational basis test).
136. See infra part IV.A (discussing the purpose of the First Amendment, and how that
purpose is frustrated by the second prong of the singling out rule).
137. 570 A.2d 601 (Pa. 1990).
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granted a tax exemption to "manufacturers". 13 Cable TV providers
challenged their exclusion from this exemption. The Court held:
Even under a strict scrutiny standard with respect to possible dis-
criminations, a classification ... distinguishing between dealing
with tangible matter on the one hand, and activities involving the
manipulation and transmission of information through the dealing
with electrical and electronic elements - is a classification which
is valid and rationally related to the purpose of the law.
139
Similar analysis has been used by some courts to escape strict scru-
tiny review altogether. Such was the case in Times Mirror Co. v. City of
Los Angeles," in which the court upheld a tax scheme that discrimi-
nated between various types of First Amendment activities.141 Times
Mirror challenged the tax scheme at issue for discriminating between
members of the press by using different methods of computing taxes for
the motion picture industry from those used for newspapers and the
broadcast media.142 In analyzing the tax, the court determined that:
"The inherent difference between these various forms of mass media is
patent. These differences are reflected in the ways in which the ultimate
product is conceived, produced, disseminated, and exhibited." 14 3 These
differences led the court to review the tax under the rational basis test,"4
a standard the tax was able to survive. 4 5 The court specifically noted
that the structure of the motion picture industry was "highly frag-
mented" and as a result the tax scheme had to be adapted accordingly.14
A contrary analysis was used by a New York court in McGraw-Hill,
Inc. v. State Tax Commission."a7 In McGraw-Hill, the plaintiff chal-
lenged a statute that taxed the advertising of the broadcast media differ-
ently from print media. 4 ' The court applied strict scrutiny following the
dictates of Minneapolis Star and Ragland. The state argued that differ-
ences between the print and visual media, including their susceptibility to
138. Id at 602.
139. Id at 608.
140. 192 Cal. App. 3d 170 (2d Dist. 1987).
141. Plaintiffs contended the tax would result in dramatically different tax burdens im-
posed on newspapers, radio, and television broadcasters as compared to the movie industry,
lectures, shows, telephone company proceeds from the yellow pages, and billboards. Id. at
178.
142. Id. at 184-85.
143. Id. at 185.
144. Id. at 183. See also Associated Film Distribution Corp. v. Thornburgh, 800 F.2d 369,
375 (3rd Cir. 1986) ("[T]he regulation of trade practices singular to the distribution of motion
pictures is not the type of differential taxation that requires application of the Minneapolis Star
test, we need not reach the issue of whether the counterbalancing state interest is of 'compel-
ling importance.' ").
145. Times Mirror, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 185.
146. Id.
147. 541 N.Y.S.2d 252 (A.D. 3d Dept. 1989).
148. Id. at 255.
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taxation, justified the scheme. The court responded: "While that may be
true, such an argument fails to show any compelling state interest in tax-
ing the two types of media differently. Thus the regulation must fail."14 9
The Times Mirror court makes a strong argument that the frag-
mented nature of the movie industry requires accommodation in the tax
system.1 50 However, the court's statement that the various mass media
are different,151 is an unpersuasive argument for application of rational
basis review absent any other protection for the press in the review
scheme. The extension of this reasoning would allow unrestrained differ-
ential taxation due to the various media's differing characteristics, risking
government censorship if content were to correlate with media type. 52
Likewise, the Suburban Cable TV court's analysis is merely that of the
Times Mirror court disguised by strict scrutiny language, and falls prey
to the same criticism.
The lower courts' analyses provide a number of helpful insights into
the workings of the singling out rule. Most importantly, the courts' va-
rying approaches suggest the undesirability of rules that do not give gui-
dance to the lower courts. The considerable variation in approaches
taken by the lower courts to differential taxation in the wake of Minneap-
olis Star and Ragland prompted the Supreme Court to attempt to pro-
vide further guidance.
I. Clarifying the Singling Out Rule: Leathers v. Medlock
In 1991, the Supreme Court revisited the singling out rule in
Leathers v. Medlock
1 53
The Court reviewed the case in order to clarify "whether the First
Amendment prevents a State from imposing its sales tax on only selected
segments of the media." ' 4 In analyzing this question, the Court dis-
cussed all three prongs of the singling out rule.
In 1987, Arkansas amended its gross receipts tax to impose the sales
tax on cable television.1 55 Other members of the press were not subject
to the tax. 56 The cable companies contended that exemption of newspa-
pers, magazines, and satellite broadcast services from the tax violated
their First Amendment rights.
149. Id This same conclusion was reached by the court in Oklahoma Broadcasters v.
Oklahoma Tax Comm'n, 789 P.2d 1312 (Okla. 1990).
150. Times Mirror, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 185. See supra notes 140-46 and accompanying
text.
151. Times Mirror, 192 Cal. App. 3d at 185.
152. See Kucharek v. Hanaway, 902 F.2d 513, 517 (1990), discussed supra notes 115-21
and accompanying text.
153. 111 S. Ct 1438 (1991).
154. Id at 1442.
155. 1987 Ark. Acts 188.
156. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. at 1441.
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Justice O'Connor writing for the Court, began analysis of the Ar-
kansas tax scheme by reexamining Minneapolis Star and Ragland. The
Court characterized these cases as standing for the proposition that "dif-
ferential taxation of First Amendment speakers is constitutionally sus-
pect when it threatens to suppress the expression of particular ideas or
viewpoints."'117 The Court justified this constitutional presumption by
noting the press's "unique role as a check on government abuse .... 158
The Court cited the three different prongs of the singling out rule
that would trigger strict scrutiny: First, the singling out of the press
from other businesses for taxation; second, the singling out of a "small
group of speakers"; third, the singling out of a speaker based on the con-
tent of speech.' 9 The Court upheld the Arkansas tax scheme in
Medlock because none of these forms of differential taxation were
present.
A. The First Prong: Singling Out The Press From Other Businesses
Medlock did not alter the original formulation of the first prong of
the singling out rule from Minneapolis Star. The Court noted that "ab-
sent a compelling justification, the government may not exercise its tax-
ing power to single out the press."'" This rule was justified because,
"the press plays a unique role as a check on government abuse, and a tax
limited to the press raises concerns about censorship of critical informa-
tion and opinion."'' This rule did not apply to the tax in Medlock,
however, because "the tax does not single out the press and does not
therefore threaten to hinder the press as a watchdog of government
activity.'
162
B. The Second Prong: Singling Out a Small Number of the Press
The focus of the Court's opinion was on clarifying the second prong
of the rule. The Court emphasized the quantity of speakers differentially
taxed in analyzing the application of the tax to only selected members of
the press. In Ragland only three magazines, at most, paid the State's
sales tax.163 In contrast, the Court noted that 100 cable systems were
157. Id. at 1443.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 1444.
160. Id. at 1443.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1444. It is also possible that the Court failed to alter this aspect of the singling
out rule because the lower courts have generally had no trouble in reaching consistent conclu-
sions with respect to singling out the press from other businesses. See. e.g., United Artists
Communications, Inc. v. City of Montclair, 209 Cal. App. 3d 248 (4th Dist. 1989); County of
Stanislaus v. Assessment Appeals l3d., 213 Cal. App. 3d 1445 (5th Dist. 1989).
163. Arkansas Writer's Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 n.4 (1987) (The appellant
maintained that only the Arkansas Times paid the sales tax. The Tax Commissioner con-
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subject to the sales tax in Medlock.1"I The Court held those 100 speakers
to be a number too large for the tax to be considered a "'penalty for a
few.' ,165
In reaching this conclusion, the Court noted that "the danger from a
tax scheme that targets a small number of speakers is the danger of cen-
sorship; a tax on a small number of speakers runs the risk of affecting
only a limited number of views." 166 The Court feared that such a tax
would "distort the market for ideas." 167 That risk was not perceived to
be present, because the tax affected a "large number of cable operators
offering a wide variety of programming .... ,168
Justice Marshall, dissenting, criticized the Court's reformulation of
the second prong. Justice Marshall noted:
From the majority's approach we can infer that three is a suffi-
ciently "small" number of affected actors to trigger First Amend-
ment problems and that one hundred is too "large" to do so. But
the majority fails to pinpoint the magic number between three and
one hundred actors above which discriminatory taxation can be
accomplished with impunity. Would the result in this case be dif-
ferent if Arkansas had only 50 cable-service providers? Or 25?169
Echoing Judge Posner's analysis in Kucharek v. Hanaway,70 Justice
Marshall warned that the majority's formulation risks the suppression of
sufficiently large mediums that correlate with certain ideas.' 71 The
Court, however, addressed Justice Marshall's argument in its analysis
under the third prong of the rule.
C. The Third Prong: Content Based Discrimination
The third prong of the singling out rule, as articulated in Ragland,
holds content based discrimination between press entities to be presump-
tively unconstitutional. 172 In Medlock, the Court determined that the
Arkansas tax was not explicitly content based. 173 This contrasted with
the statute in Ragland, which explicitly cited content as a criteria for
tended that two other periodicals also paid the tax. The Court reasoned "[w]hether there are
three Arkansas magazines paying the tax or only one, the burden of the tax clearly falls on a
limited group of publishers.").
164. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. at 1444.
165. Id. (quoting Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 592 (1983)).
166. Id at 1444.
167. Id
168. Id at 1445. Contra id at 1451 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
169. Id at 1451 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
170. 902 F.2d 513 (7th Cir. 1990). See supra notes 115-21 and accompanying text.
171. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. at 1452 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
172. See supra part I.C and accompanying text (discussing the articulation of the third
prong of the singling out rule in Arkansas Writers Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987)).
173. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. at 1445.
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assessing taxes.174 Unlike Ragland, however, the Court went beyond the
mere wording of the statute in determining whether the tax was content
based. As advocated by Judge Posner in Kucharek v. Hanaway,17 s the
Court examined the cable TV medium to determine if it correlated with
certain ideas. The Court concluded that the record established that the
cable television medium did not differ in its content from that communi-
cated by other mediums.' 76
Justice Marshall objected to this conclusion. He argued that "the
record for this case furnishes ample support for the conclusion that the
State's cable operators make unique contributions to the information
market."' 7 7 Nonetheless, even though the Court disagreed about the ac-
tual content of cable TV, the Court's conduct in examining the medium
for message correlations indicates that review of message correlation is
part of the scrutiny scheme.
IV. Critique of the Singling Out Rule
Throughout its decisions the Court has stressed the importance of
the press to our democratic scheme of governing. The singling out rule is
the Court's attempt to safeguard that role. The Court, however, has had
difficulty fashioning a rule that gives sufficient guidance to the lower
courts. This lack of guidance results from a theoretical inconsistency on
the part of the Court in addressing the press's role, and from an inability
of the Court to fashion a review scheme that maximizes the values under-
lying freedom of the press.
A. Flaws in the Theoretical Underpinnings of the Rule
Throughout its opinions on taxation and subsidization of the press,
the Court has cited the "watchdog" function of the press as the interest
which it seeks to protect. 78 The concern with the press's watchdog
function is well-founded. The drafters of the Constitution created a spe-
cial protection for "the press"'179 in the First Amendment. The First
Amendment reads: "Congress shall make no law... abridging the free-
174. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221.
175. See supra notes 115-22 and accompanying text (discussing Judge Posner's message
correlation test).
176. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. at 1445.
177. Id. at 1451 (Marshall, J., dissenting). One such contribution was Spanish language
TV.
178. See, eg., id at 1443 ('The press plays a unique role as a check on government abuse
179. Technological developments have forced the Court to recognize that "the press" is
more than just the printed press. "The press in its historic connotation comprehends every
sort of publication which affords a vehicle of information and opinion." Lovell v. City of
Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 452 (1938).
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dom of speech, or of the press.. , ."180
Unlike other constitutional provisions, the Free Press Clause does
not protect a specific liberty or right, but an institution. 1" Consequently,
the importance of protecting the press is not self-evident, but derives
from "the critical role played by the press in American society."'1 2 This
role was spelled out in the original version of the First Amendment, in-
troduced by James Madison at the constitutional convention, as one of
the "bulwarks of liberty."' 83
Freedom of speech has long been held to derive justification from
the notion that the combat of ideas produces truth. Prior to the drafting
of the Constitution, John Milton argued this point in opposition to the
English censorship laws:
[T]hough all the winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the
earth, so Truth be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and
prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grap-
ple; whoever knew Truth put to the worse in a free and open
encounter? 1
8 4
Justice Holmes articulated this concept as the market of ideas theory of
free speech, in which "the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market."' 85 It is this theory
upon which the Court relies in justifying the singling out rule.
86
The press's role in the market of ideas is unique. The press provides
the base of information upon which ordinary citizens rely.'8 7 As Justice
Learned Hand noted:
[The newspaper] industry serves one of the most vital of all general
interests: the dissemination of news from as many different
sources, and with as many different facets and colors as is possible.
180. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
181. Justice Potter Stewart, "Or Of The Press", 26 HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633 (1975).
182. Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1977) (Stewart, J., concurring). See also
Theodore I. Glasser, Competition and Diversity Among Radio Formats Legal and Structural
Issues, 17 J. BROADCASTING 127, 137 (1984) ("[Flreedom of the press is an important consti-
tutional guarantee not because a free press is inherently valuable but because a free press can
best serve the public communication needs of a democratic society.").
183. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 451 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789) (The original version of the First
Amendment as introduced by James Madison read: "The people shall not be deprived or
abridged of their right to speak, to write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the
press, as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable."). See Floyd Abrams, The
Press is Different! Reflections on Justice Stewart and the Autonomous Press, 7 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 563, 576-79 (1979).
184. JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGETICA: A SPEECH FOR THE LIBERTY OF UNLICENSED
PRINTING To THE PARLIAMENT OF ENGLAND (1644).
185. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
186. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1444 (1991) ("[A] tax on a small number of
speakers runs the risk of affecting only a limited range of views. The risk is similar to that
from content-based regulation: it will distort the market for ideas.").
187. BEN H. BAGDIKIAN, THE MEDIA MONOPOLY 237 (3d ed. 1990).
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That interest is closely akin to, if indeed it is not the same as, the
interest protected by the First Amendment; it presupposes that
right conclusions are more likely to be gathered out of a multitude
of tongues than through any kind of authoritative selection. To
many this is, and always will be, folly; but we have staked upon it
our all.' 88
Under this theory, government suppression of the press should be
avoided because it will distort the marketplace of ideas.1 9
Distortion of the marketplace of ideas is especially troubling because
of the press's role as a "watchdog" on government. 19 Alexis De Toc-
queville recognized that the press is "constantly open to detect the secret
springs of political designs and to summon the leaders of all parties in
turn to the bar of public opinion."' 91 While this theory is closely related
to that of the marketplace of ideas, it focuses not on seeking the truth,
but the narrower goal of improving self-government. 192 Due to its re-
sources, only the press as an institution is capable of serving as a watch-
dog on government. 
193
Admittedly, the marketplace of ideas theory and the watchdog the-
ory are not the only grounds upon which the First Amendment Speech
and Press Clauses may be justified.'94 Professor Tribe has noted that
justifications of freedom of speech based only upon the instrumental
functions of insuring self-government or maintaining an open market-
place of ideas might cheapen the value of free speech.195 He has noted
that freedom of speech can be "an end in itself and as a constitutive part
of personal and group autonomy."' 96 However, Professor Tribe recog-
nizes that "freedom of speech is also central to the workings of a tolera-
bly responsive and responsible democracy."' 97 And it is upon this
188. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326
U.S. 1 (1944), reh'g denied, 326 U.S. 802 (1945).
189. See Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
190. See Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B.
FouND. REs. J. 521; William T. Coleman, Jr., A Free Press- The Need to Ensure an Unfettered
Check on Democratic Government Between Elections, 59 TUL. L. REv. 243, 244 (1984).
191. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 187 (Alfred A. Knopf ed.
1945).
192. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 786 (2d ed. 1988).
193. See Abrams, supra note 183, at 592. The Supreme Court has recognized that the press
is the governmental watchdog. See, e.g., Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443 (1991)
("The press plays a unique role as a check on government abuse ... ").
194. See NOWAK, ET AL., supra note 35, at 718 (citing the function of enhancing individual
self-fulfillment).
195. See TRIBE, supra note 192, at 786-88. See also Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REv. 591, 593 (1982).
196. TRIBE, supra note 192, at 788.
197. Id.
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ground that the Court's opinions rest.198
If the purpose of a free press is to further an open marketplace of
ideas and to be a watchdog on government by providing a diverse array
of information, however, then the press today is becoming increasingly
ineffective at fulfilling its purpose. As Professor Ben Bagdikian has
noted, it is ironic that in the 1980s as many Communist societies were
forced to move away from centralized control of information, the United
States was moving in the opposite direction.1 99 The press as a whole is
becoming increasingly monopolized and concentrated.2 "°
The newspaper industry provides startling evidence of the trend to-
wards monopolization: more and more cities are being serviced by only
a single paper.201 In 1909 daily newspapers competed in 609 American
cities, but by 1986 only 28 cities had daily newspaper competition.2 °2
"No city has as many daily papers as New York, with only three," 2°3 By
comparison, "London has fourteen dailies, Paris fourteen, Rome eight-
een, Tokyo seventeen, and Moscow nine. ' '2°  It is no exaggeration to
declare daffy newspaper competition in the United States nearly extinct,
considering the Supreme Court did precisely that, in 1953, when daffy
newspaper competition was actually more robust.
205
The declining competition in the newspaper industry is especially
troubling given the historic role of newspapers in America.20 6 No other
media provides the diversity and in-depth coverage of a newspaper.20 7
As Professor Busterna notes: "[W]hile other media may occasionally of-
fer some diversity in the market for news and opinion or for advertising,
they don't appear to be good substitutes for the loss of competing daily
newspapers.
20 8
Unfortunately, newspaper monopolization results in a decrease in
198. See, eg., Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585 (1983) ("the basic assumption of our political system is that the press will often serve
as an important restraint on government").
199. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 187, at 3.
200. I at 21 ("In 1981, forty-six corporations controlled most of the business in daily
newspapers, magazines, television, books, and motion pictures. Today... the number of
giants that get most of the business has shrunk from forty-six to twenty-three.").
201. John Busterna, Trends in Daily Newspaper Ownership, 65 JOURNALISM Q. 831 (1988)
202. Eric J. Gertler, Comment, Michigan Citizens for an Independent Press v. Attorney
General: Subscribing to Newspaper Joint Operating Agreements or the Decline of Newspapers?,
39 AM. U. L. REv. 123, 129 n.27 (1989).
203. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 187, at 118.
204. Id.
205. See Times-Picayune Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 603 (1953).
206. See United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362 (S.D.N.Y. 1943); see also supra
notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
207. Keith Roberts, Antitrust Problems in the Newspaper Industry, 82 HARV. L. Rav. 319,
320-23 (1968).
208. Busterna, supra note 201, at 835.
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the news product that reaches readers.2" 9 "What a local newspaper does
not print about local affairs does not see general print at all."21 On the
other hand when daily newspaper competition exists: "[I]f a reporter
overlooks a story, his rival may get it. If he writes inaccurately, the op-
position sets the public right."21 1 As a result, when there is newspaper
competition "[t]he result should be more diversity of ideas ...more
problems noted and more diverse ideas on how to deal with these
problems which, in turn, should be reflected in the audiences of these
media."21 2 Today, however, this healthy competitive diverse newspaper
environment exists in only twenty-eight American cities.
213
Monopolization of these local markets is aggravated by the fact that
often a city's single paper is owned by a corporate newspaper chain.21 4
When a corporate chain buys a independent paper, coverage of local
news suffers.21 ' Indeed, some of the largest chains order all of their pa-
pers to endorse the same national political candidates, regardless of the
local feeling about those candidates.216 Monopoly and concentrated con-
trol call into question the very vitality of the marketplace of ideas.217 As
Professor Bagdikian has noted, monopolization undermines the press's
role of checking government and providing information for informed de-
cision making.218
209. Stephen Lacy, Impact of Repealing the Newspaper Preservation Act, 11 NEWSPAPER
RES. J. 2, 8-9 (1990) (hereinafter Impact of Repealing); see also Dominic L. Lasora, Effects of
Newspaper Competition on Public Opinion Diversity, 68 JOuRNALISM Q. 38 (1991); Shu-Ling
Chen Everett & Stephen E. Everett, How Readers and Advertisers Benefit from Local Newspa-
per Competition, 66 JOURNALISM Q. 76 (1989); Stephen Lacy, The Effect of Intracity Competi-
tion on Daily Newspaper Content, 64 JOURNALISM Q. 281 (1987).
210. MARC FRANKLIN, THE Fmsr AMENDMENT AND THE FOURTH ESrATE 466 (1985).
211. George L. Bird, Newspaper Monopoly and Political Independence, 17 JOURNALISM Q.
207 (1940).
212. Lasorsa, supra note 209, at 41.
213. Gertler, supra note 202, at 129 n.27.
214. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 187, at 4 ("At the end of World War II, for example, 80
percent of the daily newspapers in the United States were independently owned, but by 1989
the proposition was reversed, with 80 percent owned by corporate chains.").
215. See Roya Akhavan-Majid, et al., Chain Ownership and Editorial Independence: A
Case Study of Gannett Newspapers, 68 JOURNALisM Q. 59, 66 (1991) ("These results suggest
that a homogenizing effect on editorial position and policy results from chain ownership.").
See also C.N. Olien, et al., Relation Between Corporate Ownership and Editor Attitudes About
Business, 65 JouRNALisM Q. 29 (1988); Ralph P. Thrift, Jr., How Chain Ownership Affects
Editorial Vigor of Newspapers, 54 JOURNALISM Q. 329 (Summer 1967).
216. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 187, at 84. See also Daniel B. Wackman, et al., Chain News-
paper Autonomy as Reflected in Presidential Campaign Endorsements, 52 JOURNALiSM Q. 411
(Autumn 1975); Cecilie Gaziano, Chain Newspaper Homogeneity and Presidential Endorse-
ments, 1972-1988, 66 JOURNALISM Q. 836 (1989).
217. David Shelledy, Note, Access to the Press: A Teleological Analysis of a Constitutional
Double Standard, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 430 n.2 (1982) ("The marketplace of ideas lies in
disequilibrium today, it is effectively closed to new competitors.").
218. BAGDIKIAN, supra note 187, at 237.
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Recognizing the importance of preserving newspaper competition,
Congress enacted the Newspaper Preservation Act in 1970.219 The Act
grants failing newspapers a limited antitrust exception to allow the news-
paper to enter into a "joint operating agreement" '22 with a healthier
competitor.221 Unfortunately, newspapers subject to such agreements
"generally fail to provide greater depth of coverage or editorial diversity
than monopolistic newspapers. '2 22 Joint operating agreements also fail
to achieve the more limited goal of keeping failing newspapers in
business.223
These data suggest that the Court's focus solely on government in-
terference with press freedom is misplaced. Media monopoly harms the
marketplace of ideas and threatens the press's watchdog role. Court ac-
tion that would strike down government efforts to combat monopoly is at
odds with the Court's stated rationale for protecting the press. Indeed, it
is possible that differential taxation might combat monopoly and foster
the very functions of the press that the Court seeks to protect by prohib-
iting such taxation.
Commentators have suggested that the government might best rein-
vigorate the marketplace of ideas through subsidizing of fledgling or fail-
ing publishers.224 For example, Sweden has instituted a comprehensive
press subsidy program that includes differential taxation.225 The Swedish
subsidy plan has had the effect of increasing daily newspaper competi-
tion.226 The increase in competition has not been accomplished through
219. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1801-1804 (1982).
220. A "joint operating agreement" is an agreement whereby two businesses merge to
share profits and losses, yet remain distinct and independent businesses in the eyes of the
public. I § 1802.
221. Id. §§ 1801-1804.
222. Robbie Steel, Note, Joint Operating Agreements in the Newspaper Industry: A Threat
to First Amendment Freedoms, 138 U. PA. L. REv. 275, 276 (1989).
223. Impact of Repealing, supra note 209, at 2 (five newspapers subject to joint operating
agreements have gone under),
224. See EMERSON, supra note 1; Milton Hollstein, Are Newspaper Subsidies Unthinkable?,
17 COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. 15 (May/June 1978); Donald McDonald, The Media's Conflict
of Interest, THE CENTER MAGAZINE 15 (Nov.-Dec. 1976); Don Lively, Affirmative Action and
a Free Press: Policies and Problems in Promoting the First Amendment, 11 PAC. L.J. 65 (1979);
Robert G. Picard, State Intervention in U.S. Press Economics, 30 GAZETrE 3, 10 (1982); Si-
mon, supra note 3, at 59; David C. Coulson, Antitrust Law and the Media: Making The News-
papers Safe for Democracy, 57 JOURNALISM Q. 79, 84 (1980).
225. See Michael Metcalf, Public Debate: How the Scandinavians Do It, 70 SCANDINA-
VIAN REv. 72 (1982); Robert G. Picard, Government Subsidies and Newspaper Marketing in
Two Swedish Cities, 1965-1978, 28 GAZETTE 17 (1981); K. GUSTAFSSON & S. HADENIUS,
SWEDISH PRESS POLICY (1976). For a comparison of the Swedish conception of freedom of
the press with that of the United States, see Dennis Campbell, Free Press in Sweden and
America: Who's the Fairest of Them All, 8 Sw. U. L. REv. 61 (1976).
226. See John Gothberg, Newspaper Subsidies in Sweden Pose No Dangers, its Editors Feel,
60 JOURNALISM Q. 629 (1983) (arguing that since the Swedish subsidy program began in 1970
the number of newspapers has increased, and daily competition has been preserved).
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the sacrifice of editorial independence.227 Instead, the content of Swedish
papers is more diverse than here in the United States.228 Unfortunately,
any legislature that seeks to emulate Sweden by implementing a subsidy
plan using the tax structure would find an intractable barrier in the sin-
gling out rule. The Court's current articulation of the rule thus hamstr-
ings legislatures that might wish to experiment with tax programs aimed
at fostering diversity of expression.
B. Flaws in the Court's Formulation of the Rule
The Court accepted Medlock for review with an eye towards elimi-
nating some of the confusion which reigned in the lower courts. The
Court did not succeeded in this task.
The lower courts following Minneapolis Star and Ragland came to
widely disparate conclusions over what constituted a "small number" of
press entities. At one end of the spectrum were courts that held discrimi-
nation against an entire type of press to qualify.229 At the other end of
the spectrum were courts that stringently confined Minneapolis Star and
Ragland to their specific factual situations.23 The Court's reformulation
of the rule in Medlock does not seem to resolve this confusion.
The Court's avowed purpose in reviewing Medlock was to resolve
the question "whether the First Amendment prevents a State from im-
posing its sales tax on only selected segments of the media."23' The
Court, however, did not articulate any rules specific to intramedia dis-
crimination. Instead, the Court examined the discrimination between
cable TV and newspapers under the "small number" standard articulated
in Minneapolis Star.232
In Minneapolis Star 16 out of 374 newspapers paid a tax.23 In
Medlock 100 cable TV stations (all of this type of media) out of approxi-
mately 600 media members in Arkansas paid a tax.234 By upholding the
scheme in Medlock and striking down the scheme in Minneapolis Star,
the Court concluded that a tax exemption ratio of 6:1 is acceptable, but a
ratio of approximately 23:1 is not. This begs the question of what is
inherently different between these ratios to justify this conclusion.
227. Id. at 634 (Swedish editors polled were unanimous in concluding that subsidies have
not influenced the papers' editorial positions.).
228. See Metcalf, supra note 225, at 73 ('IT]he public debate of both the burning political
issues of the day and the more esoteric questions of art and culture [are] much richer in the
Scandinavian dailies than in their American counterparts.").
229. See supra notes 86-101 and accompanying text.
230. See supra notes 106-14 and accompanying text.
231. Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct 1438, 1442 (1991).
232. Id. at 1444.
233. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 579
(1983).
234. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. at 1451.
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Admittedly, the Court suggests that a "small number" of publishers
should be protected from differential taxation because of fear that the
mere threat of future crippling taxes might stifle the press from being a
watchdog.235 Nonetheless, the Court makes no argument to support a
finding that 100 cable TV stations will be less likely to succumb to this
threat than 16 newspapers. Indeed, the mere fact that an element of the
press is being singled out at all, regardless of the quantity, suggests that it
lacked the political power to protect itself from taxation. This contradic-
tion might suggest that if a threat of future crippling taxes results from
the singling out of press entities, then the Court is not offering sutficient
protection to entire mediums when singled out.
The Court's reasoning, however, suggests that a threat of future
crippling taxes does not exist when a "small number" of the press is sin-
gled out for taxation. The Court noted in Minneapolis Star, "we need
not fear that a government will destroy a selected group of taxpayers by
burdensome taxation if it must impose the same burden on the rest of its
constituency. '236 Therefore, as long as the "small number" of press enti-
ties are being taxed as a result of the lack of exemption from a tax gener-
ally applicable to other businesses, no threat of future crippling taxes will
exist. Consequently, the Court is overprotecting the "small number" of
press entities by holding them immune from paying a generally applica-
ble tax.
The Court does address those who fear that the singling out of one
medium might be censorially motivated. As part of its third prong anal-
ysis, the Court will assess correlations between a particular medium and
message, and strike down laws that single out a medium which correlates
with a certain message.237 Nonetheless, the Court fails to present an ade-
quate theory as to why it is valid to single out for taxation an entire
medium, as long as there is no correlation to message, but not valid to
single out for taxation large members of that medium when no message
correlation exists.2 38 This contradiction suggests that the Court's rule
provides too much protection to members of a particular press type sin-
gled out for taxation.
By not grounding the determination of whether a "small number" of
the press have been singled out in a consistent theory, the Court leaves
the lower courts with no guidance other than raw numbers. These num-
bers give the lower courts no meaningful guidance when faced with new
situations. Given the lower courts previous confusion in attempting to
apply the singling out rule, further confusion can be expected as the
235. Id at 1443.
236. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
237. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. at 1447.
238. In Minneapolis Star the Court did not find any message correlation or censorial effect
on the newspapers singled out. The Court merely cited a threat of future censorship. Minne-
apolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
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lower courts seek to arbitrarily determine what constitutes a "small
number" of the press.
V. Proposal: Modifying the Singling Out Rule
The intent of the singling out rule is to safeguard the watchdog ftmc-
tion of the press.2 39 Unfortunately, today the watchdog function is
threatened not only by the government, but also by unrestrained media
monopolization. 2' The singling out rule, however, does not allow legis-
latures sufficient flexibility to attempt to combat such monopolization.
Consequently, a reformulation of the rule is necessary. This Note pro-
poses that the first and third prongs of the rule remained unchanged
from the articulation in Medlock. The second prong, imposing strict
scrutiny analysis when a "small number" of the press is singled out for
taxation, should be eliminated and such taxation should be subject only
to rational basis review.
Abandonment of the entire rule would not be justified. The legisla-
ture is prevented from passing crippling taxes of general applicability by
the political constraints in our system.241 Taxes aimed solely at the press
are not subject to these same political constraints, thus the risk of future
censorship is magnified. "That threat can operate as effectively as a cen-
sor to check critical comment by the press."'242 This is the evil the first
prong of the rule was designed to combat. Consequently, such taxes
should not be upheld "unless the State asserts a counterbalancing interest
of compelling importance that it cannot achieve without differential
taxation." 243
The current second prong of the singling out rule establishes that if
a "small number" of the press are singled out from the press as a whole
for taxation, strict scrutiny should be applied. 2' The theoretical under-
pinnings of this prong are not sound.245 The stated rationale is protec-
tion of the watchdog function of the press. The first prong of the rule,
however, protects the press from crippling taxes that are not of general
applicability. Consequently, the threat of future crippling taxes on those
members taxed is not increased by the exemption of other members of
the press. This protection is therefore unnecessary.
The third prong of the singling out rule serves the important func-
tion of preventing content based discrimination between members of the
239. See Medlock, 111 S. Ct. at 1444.
240. See supra part IV.A.
241. Minneapolis Star, 460 U.S. at 585.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. See Leathers v. Medlock, 111 S. Ct. 1438, 1443-44 (1991).
245. See supra part IV.B (arguing that governmental censorship is not the only threat to
freedom of the press).
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press. Content based discrimination is particularly repugnant to the
First Amendment.246 Content based discrimination can result from both
content based and facially neutral statutes. If a statute is facially neutral,
analysis of media/message correlation is necessary to ascertain if content
discrimination results. If such a correlation is found, then strict scrutiny
is warranted.
This modification of the singling out rule would significantly
strengthen the rule's ability to safeguard the watchdog function of the
press. For example, a legislature might pass a tax scheme aimed at pre-
serving newspaper competition by granting tax exemptions to papers
with less than 30 percent of their particular market. The effect of this
exemption might be to single out a "small number" of large papers for
taxation. Under the current formulation of the singling out rule, such an
exemption would be subject to strict scrutiny for that reason alone, and
struck down.
Analysis under the modified version of the rule proposed in this
Note would proceed differently. The Court would first have to determine
if the tax at issue was one of general applicability. Here that requirement
would be met, and the tax would survive the first prong. Under the new
second prong the legislature would only need to assert a rational basis for
singling out a "small number" of large newspapers, a requirement that is
traditionally easy to meet. Under the third prong the Court would assess
whether the tax is content based. Here, the tax scheme at issue is facially
neutral. The Court, however, would need to assess the tax to ascertain
whether a message/medium correlation exists. In this case such a corre-
lation would probably not exist. The large newspapers would probably
reflect a variety of perspectives, perspectives that would be very similar
to some of the papers exempted. Likewise, the papers exempted would
span a wide variety of viewpoints and topics. Because the medium taxed
or exempted is not characterized by a particular message, strict scrutiny
would not be required. The statute would be upheld.
Conclusion
This Note recognizes the desirability of allowing legislatures free-
dom to develop approaches to combat media monopoly. Press subsidy
through differential taxation is one such method. Unfortunately, the
Court by protecting the press too zealously, denies the legislatures such
freedom. A reformulation of the singling out rule, with the elimination
of the "small numbers" strict scrutiny test, would best protect the press's
watchdog function from government and from the press itself.
246. Arkansas Writers' Project v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 227 (1983).

